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Several commentators have advocated for a new cause of 
action against medical care providers who fail to appropriately treat 
pain.1  The commentators base their advocacy on recognition from 
new research and advances in pain treatment that provide a better 
understanding of how to adequately treat pain.  The research 
provides guidelines for more successful treatment and 
management of pain, and establishes that previous fear about 
opioids2 may have been overestimated.  This new research also 
revealed that pain is grossly undertreated in the United States.3  
 
 1. See Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More 
Excuses, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 33-41 (2001) (addressing tort liability for 
inadequate pain management and discussing several possible theories for plaintiff 
recovery); Gilah R. Mayer, Bergman v. Chin: Why an Elder Abuse Case is a Stride in the 
Direction of Civil Culpability for Physicians Who Undertreat Patients Suffering from 
Terminal Pain, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 313, 314 (2003) (advocating that courts impose 
medical practice guidelines for the treatment of pain); Ben A. Rich, A Prescription 
for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1, 4-5 (2000) (advocating that new clinical practice guidelines be used as 
appropriate standard of care in inadequate pain management medical malpractice 
suits); Tonya Eippert, Note, A Proposal to Recognize a Legal Obligation on Physicians to 
Provide Adequate Medication to Alleviate Pain, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 381, 402 (1998) 
(proposing that courts recognize a medical malpractice claim when a physician 
fails to render adequate pain relief and objective evidence establishes the 
existence of pain); Jacob B. Nist, Note, Liability for Overprescription of Controlled 
Substances: Can it be Justified in Light of the Current Practice of Undertreating Pain?, 23 J. 
LEGAL MED. 85, 86 (2002) (discussing “the prevalence of prescription drug 
addiction” and proposing that physicians should only be held liable for 
inadequate treatment of pain if the physician acted in bad faith); Rima J. Oken, 
Note, Curing Healthcare Providers’ Failure to Administer Opioids in the Treatment of 
Severe Pain,  23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1917, 1923 (2002) (presenting model legislation 
holding healthcare providers liable for providing inadequate palliative care to 
their patients); Michael J. Reynolds, Note, Morphine or Malpractice: Should Courts 
Recognize a Legal Duty to Prescribe Opiates for Treating Chronic Pain, 15 ST. JOHN'S J. 
LEGAL COMM. 79, 81 (2000) (concluding it is necessary for the courts to provide a 
remedy for inadequate pain treatment). 
 2. The term “opioids” has replaced the terms “narcotics,” and “co-
analgesics.”  Opioids bind to opioid receptors in the central nervous system, which 
modify the sensory and affective aspects of pain. 
 3. See generally Kathleen Murphy-Ende, Barriers to Palliative and Supportive 
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The commentators present arguments on two fronts in their 
articles.  First, now that new standards for the treatment of pain 
have been formulated and shown to work and that physician fear 
related to opioid addiction has been shown to be overstated, 
physicians who treat pain should be held to a duty to adequately 
treat their patient’s pain.  Second, the courts, through malpractice 
cases, should force the adoption of the new practices by imposing 
them now as the standards of care, thus holding physicians liable 
when a patient unnecessarily suffers pain.4  One scholar advocates 
legislative changes, including tort liability, for failure to adhere to 
the new standards.5  Several other scholars advocate for recognition 
of the new standards in courts and for holding physicians liable by 
expanding common law medical malpractice theories to include 
inadequate pain treatment.6 
The basic premise of the scholar-advocates for tort liability in 
the area of inadequate pain treatment is the necessity of pressuring 
physicians to respond more quickly to advances in pain 
management techniques.7  Each scholar notes that medical schools 
have failed to adequately train new physicians in pain management8 
and that physicians are traditionally biased toward undertreating 
pain because of unfounded fears of opioid addiction.9  The 
scholars also argue that the pressure of potential tort liability is 
necessary to counteract other influences that discourage physicians 
from adequately prescribing opioids, such as potential criminal 
liability, civil liability, and state medical board disciplinary actions 
 
Care, 36 NURSING CLINICS OF N. AM. 843 (2001) (discussing the need for advances 
in pain management for end-of-life care); Marylin Frank-Stromborg & Anjeanette 
Christensen, A Serious Look at the Undertreatment of Pain: Part II, 5 CLINICAL J. OF 
ONCOLOGY NURSING 276 (2001) (contrasting the need for complete pain 
management with the risk of overtreatment); Rich, supra note 1; Francis X. 
Mahaney, Jr., Proper Relief of Cancer Pain is Worldwide Concern, 87 J. NAT’L CANCER 
INST. 481 (1995). 
 4. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 33-34 (discussing courts’ role in adopting new 
standards of care by imposing new guidelines in malpractice cases). 
 5. Oken, supra note 1, at 1992. 
 6. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 43; Mayer, supra note 1, at 316; Rich, supra 
note 1, at 2-3; Eippert, supra note 1, at 399-404; Nist, supra note 1, at 111; Reynolds, 
supra note 1, at 80. 
 7. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 8. Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 313; Rich, supra note 1, 
at 14-21; Eippert, supra note 1, at 390-91; Nist, supra note 1, at 93; Oken, supra note 
1, at 1933; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 88. 
 9. Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 321; Rich, supra note 1, 
at 42-44; Eippert, supra note 1, at 386-88; Nist, supra note 1, at 87-88; Oken, supra 
note 1, at 1936-38; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 88-89. 
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for overprescribing.10 
An additional issue alluded to by some scholars who advocate 
for broader tort liability relates to the care of patients who are 
terminally ill and in pain, but receive inadequate pain treatment.11  
In these circumstances, physicians have to consider the additional 
factor that opioids have the potential to kill the already-weakened 
patient.12  Some scholars argue that physicians have an affirmative 
duty to relieve a terminal patient’s pain despite the risk of 
hastening the patient’s death.13  They also argue that courts should 
impose this duty.14  However, this implicates significant issues 
relating to physician-assisted suicide, a patient’s right to die, and 
moral choices made by physicians when determining whether they 
are willing to take affirmative actions that could do harm.  
Although the Supreme Court held that “a patient has a 
constitutionally protected right to palliative care, even if such care 
has the ultimate effect of hastening death,”15 the Court did not go 
so far as finding an affirmative duty to provide palliative care that 
could result in the untimely death of the patient.16  At first glance, 
tort liability for inadequate pain treatment is appealing because it 
would theoretically pressure physicians to adopt the most current 
standards for pain treatment that should, in turn, help alleviate a 
patient’s pain.  However, tort liability does not account for the 
underlying causes of the problem; it simply exerts an additional 
pressure on physicians.  In this case, additional pressure might not 
be an appropriate solution.  Physicians are currently fearful of 
overprescribing opioids due to the potential for disciplinary actions 
and criminal proceedings, in addition to fears of possibly harming 
their patient.17  A tort cause of action would do nothing to ease 
 
 10. Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 324-25; Rich, supra 
note 1, at 44-55; Eippert, supra note 1, at 401; Nist, supra note 1, at 85; Oken, supra 
note 1, at 1943-46; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 82-86. 
 11. Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 313; Rich, supra note 1, 
at 6-14; Nist, supra note 1, at 87; Oken, supra note 1, at 1921; Reynolds, supra note 
1, at 79-80. 
 12. See Myra Glajchen, Chronic Pain: Treatment Barriers and Strategies for Clinical 
Practice, 14 J. AM. BD. OF FAM. PRAC. 211, 216 (2001) (respiratory depression is an 
unwanted side effect of opioid therapy). 
 13. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 341; Oken, supra note 1, at 1992. 
 14. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 341; Oken, supra note 1, at 1992. 
 15. Oken, supra note 1, at 1956. 
 16. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801-03 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 736-38 (1997). 
 17. See generally David A. Fleming, Relieving Pain: What Are Today’s Ethical and 
Legal Risks?, 99 MO. MED. 560, 560 (2002). 
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these fears.  Rather, it would simply add an additional fear that 
could leave physicians feeling as though pain treatment is 
professionally untenable. 
Other factors weigh against adding a cause of action for 
inadequate pain treatment.  Inadequate pain treatment does not fit 
within the traditional notion of medical malpractice because a 
patient could not say that the physician caused the pain.  Rather, 
the physician simply failed to alleviate the patient’s pre-existing 
pain.  In addition, pain is completely subjective—there is no 
diagnostic test a physician (or the courts) can use to verify the 
existence or amount of pain an individual is suffering18—thus, pain 
is not certain enough to allow tort liability.  Finally, tort liability for 
inadequate pain treatment could result in fewer physicians 
practicing pain management and thereby increase the costs of pain 
treatment.  The net result may be that some patients will not 
receive any treatment for their pain. 
Part I of this note reviews current issues relating to pain 
treatment.19  Part II examines theoretical justifications of proposed 
tort liability for inadequate pain management.20  Part III examines 
how pain mismanagement does not fit within traditional notions of 
medical malpractice.21  Part IV studies the issues relating to a 
physician’s role as “gate-keeper” for opioids and suggests why tort 
liability could compromise this legislatively imposed role.22  Part V 
examines the issue of pain management in the context of end-of-
life care.23  Part VI discusses current shifts in pain management 
philosophies and explains how these movements will effectuate the 
changes suggested by advocates of expanded tort liability.24 
I. THE TREATMENT OF PAIN 
The underlying problem is that medical professionals have not 
kept their pain management practices and beliefs up to date with 
 
 18. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF PAIN MANAGEMENT THROUGH MEASUREMENT AND ACTION 
4 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.jcaho.org/news+room/health+care+issues/ 
pain+mono_jc.pdf [hereinafter JCAHO Pain Assessment]. 
 19. See infra Part I. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. See infra Part VI. 
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the current research regarding pain treatment.25  Clinical research 
by pain management specialists has established that traditional 
fears of patient addiction to opioids are largely unfounded.26  This 
research also establishes that the traditional method of pain 
treatment on a “PRN” (as needed) basis is not the proper 
approach.27  Instead, research has shown that optimum pain relief 
is obtained by providing continuous baseline dosages, which not 
only require smaller doses of opioids because the pain never 
“breaks through,” but also provide substantially greater pain relief 
because the patient does not have to suffer pain in order to obtain 
pain relief.28  However, this methodology has not found its way into 
mainstream medical practice.  The majority of physicians still 
prescribe opioids on a PRN basis.29  In addition, the majority of 
physicians do not aggressively treat pain with controlled opioids out 
of fears of addiction and fears of criminal and professional 
sanctions for over prescribing opioids.30 
Medical professionals are forced to choose between many 
competing priorities when managing a patient’s pain.  The first 
priority is to minimize the patient’s pain.  The second priority is to 
minimize the potential harm to the patient and to the physician.  
The potential harms include: patient addiction to opioid 
analgesics, premature patient death due to inhibition of 
respirations in weakened patients, compromised mental status of 
the patient, diversion of controlled substances from the patient to a 
drug abuser, abuse of controlled substances acquired fraudulently 
by patients,31 administrative discipline, and criminal and/or civil 
liability for the physician for providing abused drugs.32 
One factor often cited to explain why physicians have not 
changed their pain treatment practices is that medical schools do 
not provide adequate training in pain management.33  In addition, 
 
 25. Richard Penson et al., Trust Violated: Analgesics for Addicts, 8 THE 
ONCOLOGIST 199, 205 (2003). 
 26. See JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17. 
 27. See Glajchen, supra note 12 at 213-14. 
 28. See id. (long-acting opioids, administered at regular intervals, reduce 
peak-and-trough effects found with short-acting opioids). 
 29. See Fleming, supra note 17. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Glajchen, supra note 12, at 216-17. 
 32. See JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17. 
 33. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 28; Mayer, supra note 1, at 320 n.64; Rich, 
supra note 1, at 5; Eippert, supra note 1, at 390-91; Nist, supra note 1, at 95; Oken, 
supra note 1, at 1933-34; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 88. 
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current standards of care do not adequately reflect advancements 
in pain management.  This results in new doctors learning the 
same misinformation from prior generations.34  A related factor is 
that “[m]edical regulators, such as state licensing boards, have not 
been as concerned about the care of an individual patient as they 
have been about protecting the public from inappropriate medical 
practices, such as the over prescribing of controlled substances.”35  
“[M]edical board members generally are aware that prescription 
drugs are abused with greater frequency than either heroin or 
marijuana.  Consequently, these boards sometimes scrutinize the 
prescribing practices of physicians who order controlled substances 
to treat their patients’ pain.”36  In addition to state regulators, the 
federal government plays a role.  “[T]he DEA’s [Drug Enforcement 
Agency] law enforcement mindset . . . [gives] perhaps undue 
weight to the negative externalities associated with access to 
narcotics and not trusting health care professionals.”37  The effect 
of this increased scrutiny on physicians’ prescribing practices has 
been to significantly discourage physicians from prescribing 
opioids to treat their patients’ pain.38 
This is related to what may be the most significant barrier to 
effective pain control: the fear of addiction. 
[T]here exists generally in today’s society a major concern 
about narcotic addiction.  This understandable cultural 
concern is unfortunately also reflected in the medical 
community’s approach to treating patients suffering with 
pain.  Many medical practitioners have justified their 
refusal to administer analgesics to patients in pain by 
adhering to their fear that the patient will become 
addicted to the medication.39 
To some extent this is attributable to physician confusion 
about physical dependence versus addiction.  Physical dependence 
is an expected side effect of long-term opioid use and is often 
characterized by drug “tolerance and is manifested by a drug class 
 
 34. See sources cited supra note 33. 
 35. Frank-Stromborg, supra note 3, at 276. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management 
Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 64 (2003). 
 38. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 33; Mayer, supra note 1, at 324-25; Rich, supra 
note 1, at 43; Eippert, supra note 1, at 387-88; Nist, supra note 1, at 87; Oken, supra 
note 1, at 1944-46; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 83-84. 
 39. Eippert, supra note 1, at 387 (citations omitted). 
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specific withdrawal syndrome that can be produced by . . . 
decreasing blood level of the drug.”40  Addiction, on the other 
hand, “is characterized by behaviors that include one or more of 
the following: impaired control over drug use, compulsive use, 
continued use despite harm, and craving.”41  Opioid addiction is a 
valid fear, but “[i]n general, patients in pain do not become 
addicted to opioids.”42  For example, in the case of cancer pain, no 
study demonstrates that prescribing opioids for cancer pain 
contributes to addiction or drug-abuse problems.43  Thus, 
physicians’ unfounded fears substantially contribute to their 
practice of inadequate pain management.  However, although 
addiction rates are lower than historically believed, there is still the 
potential for patients to become addicted to opioids as “studies 
report drug abuse/dependence/addiction in 3 to 19 percent of 
chronic pain patients.”44 
In addition, the abuse of pain-relieving drugs is a 
phenomenon that is growing at a staggering rate in the United 
States.  The latest research indicates that the number of new pain-
reliever abusers increased more than four fold between 1990 and 
200045 to a level equivalent to that of new marijuana abusers.46  To 
put this growth in perspective, between 1990 and 2000 only ecstasy 
added new users/abusers at a higher rate.47  Thus, while there 
appears to be limited problems with pain reliever addiction by 
sufferers of cancer and chronic pain, there is a substantial and 
growing problem with the abuse of pain relieving drugs by non-
medical users/abusers. 
Barriers from patients and their family can also work against 
effective pain management.  “Patients may be reluctant to report 
 
 40. JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Murphy-Ende, supra note 3, at 846. 
 44. Dawn A. Marcus, Treatment of Nonmalignant Chronic Pain, 61 AM. FAM. 
PHYSICIAN 1331, 1337 (2002). 
 45. See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results 
from the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings, Chapter 6, 
Figure 6.3 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.drugabusestatistics.samhsa.gov/ 
nhsda/2k2nsduh/2k2SoFW.pdf [hereinafter 2002 Drug Survey] (stating “[p]ain 
reliever incidence [of new non-medical users] increased from 1990, when there 
were 628,000 initiates, to 2000, when there were 2.7 million”). 
 46. Id.  Comparing Figure 6.1 with Figure 6.3 shows there were 2.4 million 
new abusers of pain relievers versus 2.6 million new marijuana users in 2001.  Id. 
 47. Id.  Comparing Figure 6.2 with Figure 6.3 shows there were 168,000 new 
users in 1993 versus 1.9 million in 2000–an increase of over eleven fold.  Id. 
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pain because they do not want to distract their physician from 
treating the disease, for fear of injections, or because pain signifies 
disease progression.”48  “[M]any patients and caregivers believe that 
pain is an unavoidable consequence of cancer and do not attempt 
to alleviate it.”49  “Misconceptions about addiction and tolerance 
and concerns about opioid-related side effects, including 
constipation, nausea, confusion, or drowsiness, may prevent 
patients from taking prescribed medications.”50  Patient failure to 
adhere to pain management plans due to forgetfulness can also 
lead to poor pain control and has been identified as a major 
barrier to effective pain management.51  A patient’s personal 
experience, cultural and religious beliefs, and attitudes toward pain 
and medication may also affect pain management and reporting.52  
Finally, a lack of insurance coverage for many forms of long-term 
pain-management treatments and drugs may prevent many patients 
from gaining proper access to pain management.53  For example, 
Medicare does not cover oral-prescription pain medication for 
most outpatients.54 
A. Types of Pain 
There are three basic categories of pain that are relevant to a 
discussion regarding expanding tort liability for failing to 
adequately treat pain: acute pain, chronic pain that is 
nonmalignant, and pain that is associated with a terminal condition 
such as cancer.55  Each type of pain requires varied considerations 
by the medical professional treating the pain.  One extreme is the 
case of pain associated with a terminal or incurable condition, 
where it is appropriate for the physician to stop aggressive curative 
measures and to concentrate instead on palliation, which is 
characterized by “a singular focus on maximizing the quality of the 
 
 48. Murphy-Ende, supra note 3, at 844. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 845. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See JCAHO Pain Assessement, supra note 18, at 16. 
 53. Diane E. Hoffmann, Pain Management and Palliative Care in the Era of 
Managed Care: Issues for Health Insurers, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267, 267 (1998). 
 54. Jeff Grabmeier, Fear of Regulators Keeps Some Doctors from Good Pain 
Treatment (Feb. 26, 1999), at http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/painman.htm. 
 55. There are other categories of pain that are relevant to medical diagnosis 
and treatment, but are not directly relevant to a discussion of tort liability for 
inadequate pain management. 
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patient’s life.”56  In this case, fear of addiction or abuse should not 
be significant considerations beyond their effect on the quality of 
the patient’s remaining life.  Another extreme is the case of acute 
pain where there are other significant considerations.  In the case 
of acute pain, such as a rotator cuff injury, it is often necessary to 
minimize pain treatment in order to promote healing of the 
underlying problem because the opioids used to treat pain can 
“produce lethargy, apathy, physical dependence[,] and depression” 
that could interfere with healing.57  In other cases of acute pain, 
such as postoperative pain, adequate pain management is essential 
to promote healing.58  The final type of pain, chronic pain that is 
nonmalignant, can pose the most significant challenge to the 
physician because the pain treatment has to be balanced against 
the potential for addiction, quality of life, and the potential for 
diversion of opioids for illicit purposes.59  These different types of 
pain are significant when considering a legal duty for physicians to 
alleviate pain because in each circumstance the justification for 
imposing a legal duty on the physician is different.  At the same 
time, consideration should also be given to the idea of not 
imposing a legal duty on physicians to adequately control the 
patient’s pain. 
B. Prescription Drug Abuse and the War on Drugs 
The “War on Drugs” and prescription drug abuse have had 
significant impacts on physicians prescribing opioids and other 
controlled substances.60  The social “evils” of drug abuse, including 
prescription drug abuse, are regularly publicized in the media.61  
This has affected the public’s perception of opioids to the point 
that there is a social stigma against their use.  For example, 
 
 56. Rich, supra note 1, at 3. 
 57. Carlton Miller, Arthritis and the Role of the Physician in Nonmalignant Pain 
and Disability, 16 J. HEALTH & SOC. POL’Y 33, 39 (2002). 
 58. See Benzion Beilin et al., The Effects of Postoperative Pain Management on 
Immune Response to Surgery, 97 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 822, 826 (2003); see also 
Inger F. Oey et al., Postoperative Pain Detracts from Early Health Status Improvement 
Seen After Video-assisted Thoracoscopic Lung Volume Reduction Surgery, 24 EUR. J. 
CARDIO-THORACIC SURGERY 588, 588 (2003). 
 59. See generally Glajchen, supra note 12. 
 60. See Gregory E. Skipper, The Oxycontin Dilemma, 16 ALA. BOARD OF MED. 
EXAMINERS NEWSL. 1, 1 (Spring 2001), available at http://www.albme.org/ 
PDFs/NLSpg01.PDF. 
 61. Id. 
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OxyContin has allowed many patients suffering from severe-
chronic pain to carry on normal activities that were once 
impossible due to the severity of their pain.62  However, OxyContin 
has received significant “bad press” because of pharmacy robberies 
and fatal overdoses linked to its abuse.  In addition, OxyContin has 
a substantial street value.63  As a direct result, physicians are 
cautious in prescribing OxyContin and some legitimate users are 
wary of continuing its use.64  Similarly, physicians are wary of 
prescribing controlled substances to patients out of fear they are 
being deceived as to the truth of the patient’s assertion of pain.65  
This fear is not unwarranted as “[p]atients deceiving their 
physicians . . . constitute the largest percentage of controlled 
substance abusers.”66 
Patients who deceive physicians to obtain controlled 
substances are considered “drug seekers.”67  Behaviors commonly 
exhibited by drug seekers include requesting specific narcotics, 
inconsistencies between the patient’s reported level of pain and 
what the physical exam indicates to the physician, and visiting 
multiple physicians to obtain duplicate prescriptions.68  However, in 
some situations it can be very difficult for a physician to distinguish 
between a drug seeker and a true pain sufferer because they often 
exhibit similar behaviors.69  “[P]suedoaddiction, refers to patient 
behaviors that may occur when pain is undertreated, including 
increased focus on obtaining medications (‘drug seeking’), ‘clock 
watching,’ and even illicit drug use or deception.”70  
Pseudoaddiction can be distinguished from true addiction because 
such behaviors resolve with effective pain management.”71 
Because some patients deceive their physician and 
 
 62. See Carolyn Kleiner, A Curse and a Cure, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 6, 
2001, at 42. 
 63. See Skipper, supra note 60 (stating “[S]ixty 40mg tablets of OxyContin, 
which retail for about $300, can bring $2400 on the black market.”). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Penson, supra note 25, at 199-200. 
 66. See Nist, supra note 1, at 107 (citing Bonnie B. Wilford et al., An Overview 
of Prescription Drug Misuse and Abuse: Defining the Problem and Seeking Solutions, 22 J. 
L. MED. & ETHICS 197, 199 (1994)). 
 67. “Drug seeker” is derived from one who displays “drug-seeking” behavior.  
See Penson, supra note 25, at 205. 
 68. See Glajchen, supra note 12, at 216-17. 
 69. See id. at 216. 
 70. JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17. 
 71. Id. 
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fraudulently obtain controlled substances, physicians may look 
beyond reported pain to the physician’s relationship and history 
with the individual patient.72  Physicians’ fear of prescribing 
controlled substances is most pronounced when the patient-
physician relationship is new and the patient’s pain is not 
substantiated by either physical indication of injury or disease that 
normally accompanies pain;73 or in the case of reported chronic 
pain, where the patient does not provide adequate medical history 
for the physician to verify the patient’s pain treatment history.  In 
these cases, the physician might refuse to prescribe a controlled 
narcotic or only prescribe a limited quantity of opioids sufficient to 
allow the patient time to substantiate their medical history.74 
II. TRADITIONAL TORT JUSTIFICATIONS DO NOT WARRANT 
LIABILITY FOR INADEQUATE PAIN MANAGEMENT 
There are two theoretical justifications that underlie the tort 
system: “utilitarianism and those based upon individual moral 
rights.”75  Utilitarian justifications focus on using tort law as a tool 
to implement social or public policy goals, such as deterrence by 
imposing the threat of liability on tortfeasors.76  Justifications that 
focus on individual moral rights view tort law as a way of achieving 
justice between parties, such as compensation for harms wrongly 
imposed by a tortfeasor.77  Some scholars believe that only one or 
the other justification for the tort system is correct while other 
scholars argue that the tort system incorporates elements of both 
justifications.78  In the context of pain management, the scholars 
 
 72. See Glajchen, supra note 12, at 216-17. 
 73. See Eippert, supra note 1, at 389 (suggesting that tort liability should only 
be imposed where the existence of pain can be established through objective 
evidence). 
 74. See Watkins v. U.S., 589 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding physician has 
duty to investigate history of mental illness when prescribing large amounts of a 
controlled substance to a patient).  If there is a duty to investigate a patient’s 
mental history, then it is likely a court could find a duty to investigate a patient’s 
substance abuse history before prescribing large amounts of a controlled 
substance to such a patient.  Id. 
 75. Jeffrey O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in 
Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and 
Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. REV. 137, 138 (1999) (citing Stephen R. Perry, The Moral 
Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 449 (1992)). 
 76. O’Connell & Robinette, supra note 75 at 138. 
 77. Id. at 138-39. 
 78. See generally id. 
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advocating tort liability for inadequate pain management base their 
arguments primarily on the utilitarian justification of changing the 
medical practice through tort liability and secondarily on the 
individual’s right to compensation for pain that should not have 
been suffered had it been properly treated by the physician.79 
A. The Utilitarian Justification 
The basic utilitarian justification offered in support of tort 
liability80 for inadequate pain management is that tort liability will 
force physicians to adopt new standards of pain management and 
help overcome other factors that contribute to physicians’ 
decisions that result in undertreatment of pain. 
1. Can Tort Liability Change Medical Practice Regarding Pain 
Management? 
The argument that tort liability will force physicians to adopt 
new standards of pain management is fundamentally based, 
although not explicitly expressed, on previous changes that tort 
liability has arguably generated upon medical practice. 
There are many examples of tort liability, where courts have 
arguably effectuated changes in the practice of medicine by 
adopting new standards of care.  In Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California,81 the California Supreme Court held a 
therapist to a duty to warn potential victims after his patient 
expressed a serious and credible intent to harm those persons.  
“According to a study . . . Tarasoff was effective in rendering 
psychiatrists and psychologists, especially in California, 
considerably more willing to notify potential victims and also public 
authorities when dealing with dangerous patients.”82 
Helling v. Carey83 “found malpractice as a matter of law 
whenever a doctor does not include a glaucoma pressure test 
within a routine eye exam.”84  A study found that the level of 
routine glaucoma testing of patients under age forty by Washington 
ophthalmologists went up by a substantial percentage in the years 
 
 79. See sources cited supra note 1. 
 80. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort 
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 379 (1994). 
 81. 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976). 
 82. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 399-400. 
 83. 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974). 
 84. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 400. 
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following the decision.85 
Another area of medicine that tort liability has changed is the 
surgical precautions taken to prevent leaving a surgical tool in a 
patient, which frequently leads to malpractice actions.86  “[T]o 
prevent such lawsuits and better protect patients, hospitals are 
prescribing a variety of new operating-room procedures, from 
computerizing the way they keep track of surgical tools to bearing 
down on doctors who seem overly eager to close up a patient 
before all tools have been accounted for.”87 
The informed consent doctrine is often cited as a primary 
example of how tort liability can generate beneficial change in 
medicine.88  Studies based on a Canadian opinion that broadened a 
doctor’s duty to provide informed consent found that sixty percent 
of the surgeons who had been made aware of the decision chose to 
modify their practice to spend more time discussing surgical risks 
with patients.89  A Harvard study of New York physicians showed 
that “during the previous decade the threat of liability led almost 
seventy-eight percent of physicians to spend more time ‘explaining 
risks’ to patients.”90 
In each of these examples, it is arguable that judicially 
imposed tort liability changed the medical profession by altering 
the physician’s standard of care.  In each case, the judicially 
imposed duty required medical professionals to take additional 
action that was not previously part of the standard of care.  In some 
respects, a court mandating a broader standard of care for pain 
management is similar.  However, the standard of care for pain 
management is a significantly more complex issue than the 
examples cited.  Each example concerned a very specific obligation 
that was imposed on doctors that was easily measurable, potentially 
as a matter of law.91  A court cannot mandate how a physician 
should treat pain because each patient requires individual 
considerations.  A court cannot simply mandate that a physician 
has an obligation to provide opioids to any patient claiming 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 399. 
 87. Id. at 399 (quoting Edward Felsenthal, Forgotten Surgical Tools Spur 
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1992, at B12). 
 88. Id. at 401. 
 89. Id. at 400-01. 
 90. Id. at 401. 
 91. Id. 
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sufficient pain, as this would be illegal.92  In addition, a court 
cannot mandate what the standard of care for pain management 
should be, especially in light of the level of detail required for 
determining an individual case because there is not a single 
standard of care—it varies from case to case.  “Many strategies exist 
to manage various types of pain.”93 
There are a multitude of practice guidelines in existence, and 
they only provide generalities, not specific treatment protocols.  As 
an example, JCAHO recently stated that “[s]ystem barriers to pain 
assessment and management include an absence of clearly 
articulated practice standards,”94 despite documenting thirty-one 
separate clinical practice guidelines that had been produced by 
various organizations between 1992 and 2000 to specify how to 
treat pain in various situations.95  If one of the barriers to pain 
management is the lack of clearly articulated practice standards, 
then it is clearly unreasonable to expect a court to impose an 
effective standard of care based on existing clinical practice 
guidelines that physicians follow today in avoiding tort liability.  
Thus, it is unlikely that a court would be able to effectuate the type 
of systematic change that may have been shown in previous cases by 
simply dictating the standard of care to the medical profession. 
2. Can Tort Liability Overcome Other Factors that Contribute to the 
Undertreatment of Pain? 
Perhaps the most unsupported proposition by the proponents 
of tort liability for inadequate pain treatment is the scholars’ 
assertion that tort liability will overcome other factors that 
contribute to the undertreatment of pain.96  However, none of the 
scholars support this conclusion with direct evidence; it is only a 
logical assumption that is made.97  Deterrence is the basic method 
through which tort liability can produce utilitarian changes on 
 
 92. See infra Part IV.A and note 167 (Only a physician can make the 
determination that the use of a controlled substance is for a “legitimate medical 
purpose.”). 
 93. JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18. 
 94. Id. at 15. 
 95. Id. at 75. 
 96. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 350 (stating that “the impact of the [Bergman 
v. Chin, No. H205732-1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2001)] case will serve to improve 
treatment of all patients suffering needlessly from pain”); Oken, supra note 1, at 
1968-69, 1981; Nist, supra note 1, at 87-88; Furrow, supra note 1, at 28-31. 
 97. See supra note 96. 
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society.  “By imposing the threat of liability on tortious conduct, the 
law can discourage parties from engaging in that conduct.”98  In the 
case of pain management, the goal of tort liability would be to 
deter undertreatment in the face of preexisting substantial 
deterrence for overtreatment. 
In the case of medical malpractice, it is questionable how 
much tort liability truly deters negligence due to the liability 
insurance that most physicians carry.  Typically, physicians are not 
personally held financially responsible for adverse medical 
malpractice decisions or the litigation costs associated with a 
medical malpractice claims.99  There is limited indirect pressure 
created by malpractice insurers because the insurers usually do not 
base malpractice premiums on past claims of individual 
physicians.100  In the case of physicians, malpractice premiums are 
calculated based on broad specialty groupings.101  Thus, tort liability 
does not directly deter physicians.  However, without any doubt, 
tort liability has some indirect deterrent effect on physicians. 
[T]he threat of tort litigation has a substantial 
psychological impact on physicians in excess of the 
diluted financial incentives created.  Physicians 
overestimate the risk of being sued and the size of feared 
judgments.  The sheer unpleasantness of being sued also 
deters, although it has been argued that the lack of clarity 
as to the locus of negligence in most cases does not 
provide useful feedback to providers.102 
In order for tort liability to deter undertreatment of pain, it 
would have to overcome the physician’s fears of disciplinary action 
and criminal prosecution that have contributed to the physician’s 
decision to undertreat pain. 
Doctors’ fears of disciplinary action and criminal 
prosecution are justified.  There is no evidence that large 
numbers of physicians are sanctioned for their treatment 
of patients in pain, but the impact of the process on those 
physicians who are only investigated, or only charged but 
not disciplined, or only warned or cautioned but not 
 
 98. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 381. 
 99. This is, of course, true where insurance covers negligent behavior of any 
kind. 
 100. See Skipper, supra note 60; see also SCOTT BECKER, HEALTH CARE LAW: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE § 12.06, 1-12 (2d ed. 2003). 
 101. BECKER, supra note 100. 
 102. Furrow, supra note 1, at 30. 
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penalized is severe.  The prosecutorial stance stimulated 
by a “war on drugs” and by increasing public scrutiny of 
disciplinary agencies may unintentionally interfere with 
adequate pain relief because it has intensified and 
criminalized investigations and later proceedings.  
Descriptions of the investigation of physicians engaged in 
the treatment of pain patients with controlled substances 
present a scenario that would easily intimidate most 
people.  Some evidence also suggests that many state 
medical boards have not adapted to more current 
approaches to the use of controlled substances in pain 
management and that they may rely solely or too heavily 
on dosage and length of treatment as indicators of 
inappropriate and illegitimate prescription practices . . . .  
State disciplinary boards are also involved, often in 
collaboration with criminal prosecutors, in the war against 
drugs, penalizing providers who prescribe controlled 
substances that can be diverted to street use or who 
themselves deal drugs using their prescriptive authority.103 
There is no evidence that the deterrence effect of tort liability can 
overcome or even mitigate the deterrence effect of imprisonment 
or loss of medical license that has deterred so many physicians into 
playing it safe—and, in effect, undertreating pain. 
An additional factor in this equation of deterrence is that 
physicians perceive that the medical malpractice system is not 
entirely fair and accurate.  To some extent, there is the belief that 
juries do not have the education or training to fairly evaluate 
whether a physician’s decision was proper and that juries instead 
are sympathetic with injured patients and view physicians, hospitals, 
and their insurers as deep pockets that can afford to compensate 
the sympathetic patient.  To the extent that physicians view the 
medical malpractice system as a “litigation lottery,” its potential to 
deter physician conduct is limited.104  It is arguable that one of the 
main effects of medical malpractice on the practice of medicine is 
to encourage physicians to practice “defensive medicine.”105  This 
practice involves ordering tests and treatments that are only 
minimally indicated or not cost effective in the judgment of the 
 
 103. Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain 
Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319, 320 (1996). 
 104. Theresa M. Hottenroth, Lessons From Canada: A Prescription for Medical 
Liability Reform, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 285, 288 (1994). 
 105. Id. at 289. 
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physician.  Nevertheless, they are ordered either to create 
information predominately for future litigation purposes or 
alternatively because the patient threatens to sue the physician in 
order to have the test/procedure performed.106  The main 
disincentive to defensive medicine is that it increases the cost of 
health care for everyone; whereas the physician is encouraged to 
practice defensively by the more personal threat of litigation.107 
The phenomenon of defensive medicine to some extent 
reflects the disdain that physicians have for the jury as a decision 
maker: the physician practices defensive medicine because he or 
she does not trust that the jury will come to what the physician 
considers a proper medical judgment regarding whether a test or 
procedure was warranted given the information available to the 
physician when the decision was made.108  One worry is that the jury 
will improperly make a post hoc determination of whether the test 
or procedure was warranted based on the result of the decision.  
This effect of limited deterrence of civil judgments could be 
especially pronounced in a physician’s determination of how to 
treat pain because it likely indicates that more weight will be given 
to factors such as state medical boards, hospital regulations, and 
perceived criminal liability than to what a civil court says. 
3. What Side Effects Could Tort Liability Have if Imposed for 
Inadequate Pain Management? 
To justify expanded tort liability based on utilitarian goals, it is 
essential to examine the complete effect tort liability could have on 
pain management.  A significant disadvantage to tort liability for 
mismanaging pain is that it may decrease the overall availability of 
pain management and increase the cost of pain management. 
It will be expensive to litigate cases of pain mismanagement.  
Expensive expert testimony will be required by both parties in 
order to determine if the defendant’s conduct complied with or 
deviated from the standard of care.109  There are situations in which 
pain cannot be clinically controlled regardless of what treatment is 
 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See BECKER, supra note 100 (indicating that a court could not articulate a 
standard of care for pain management that precludes the need for expert 
testimony to establish the standard of care). 
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used,110 requiring additional expert testimony regarding the 
efficacy of treating the patient’s pain.  In addition, complete pain 
elimination is not the goal of opioid use when treating chronic 
pain.111  This will also require expert testimony to determine 
whether the optimum level of pain relief was achieved.  Another 
factor is that the subjective nature of pain will require additional 
expert testimony to establish whether the plaintiff actually suffered 
pain.  The subjective nature of pain will also make it difficult to 
dispose of trivial or frivolous claims by summary judgment motions, 
as the injury to the plaintiff and appropriateness of the physician’s 
response will be factual, not legal issues.  In addition, the number 
of people suffering from pain in the United States is substantial.  
“Each year, an estimated 25 million Americans experience acute 
pain due to injury or surgery and another 50 million suffer chronic 
pain.”112  The sheer number of people suffering some form of pain 
in the United States could result in a flood of litigation given the 
current inadequacies of pain management practices and the 
supposition that ten percent of chronic pain is uncontrollable.113  
Finally, inadequate pain management has the potential for high 
damage awards.114  The potential for high damage awards may lead 
to high pretrial settlement costs because plaintiffs will have a high 
expectation for the value of their claims. 
Physicians’ medical malpractice insurance policies will most 
likely cover the costs of litigation and damage awards.  As a result, 
insurance companies will have to raise insurance premiums to 
cover these new expenses.  Insurance companies will likely raise all 
 
 110. Rich, supra note 1, at 7 (“There is a strong consensus that . . . ninety 
percent of all pain experienced by patients can be relieved.”).  This implies that 
ten percent of all pain cannot be relieved. 
 111. Marcus, supra note 44. 
 112. JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 3; see also Rich, supra note 1, at 
15 (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, CHRONIC PAIN: HOPE THROUGH 
RESEARCH, Pub. No. 90-2406, 2-3 (1989) (noting a 1989 study found that “five 
million Americans suffer[ed] from back pain alone, of which two million [were] 
so disabled they [could not] work.”)). 
 113. See Hottenroth, supra note 104, at 7 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Terrie Lewis, Perspectives on Elder Law: Pain Management for the Elderly, 
29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 223, 235, 237 (2002) (In 1990, a North Carolina jury 
ordered a nursing home to pay $7.5 million in compensatory damages and $7.5 
million in punitive damages for not providing a patient pain medication for three 
days.  In 1998, a California jury awarded $1.5 million for under-medicating a 
patient’s pain for five days as he was dying from lung cancer under an elder abuse 
statute); see also Oken, supra note 1, at 1979 (stating “[J]urors will make physicians 
pay heavily for needless patient suffering”). 
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physicians’ premiums, not just those of the physicians being sued 
because “insurers cannot and do not vary premiums very much 
according to accident record.  It is too complex, and too unreliable 
statistically.”115  However, insurance companies would likely 
respond by creating a new practice category for insurance 
coverage, allowing them to charge additional premiums only to 
physicians who practice pain management,116 and these additional 
premiums would likely be significant.117  This could result in 
physicians choosing not to practice pain management to avoid 
additional and potentially significant malpractice premiums. 
Tort liability also has the potential to place the doctor in a no-
win situation.  The standards a court could impose on physicians 
would not necessarily be compatible with existing state criminal 
standards or federal standards.  An example is the New York State 
Controlled Substance Act, which defines an addict as being “a 
person who habitually uses a narcotic drug and who by reason of 
such use is dependent thereon.”118  “That statute prohibits 
physicians from prescribing controlled substances to an ‘addict’ 
unless that person is a patient of the physician and is suffering from 
an incurable and fatal disease.”119  “[A] narrow and rigid 
interpretation of such statutory language would likely preclude a 
physician from effectively controlling the chronic pain of patients 
whose condition could not be labeled terminal.”120  However, most 
pain management guidelines specify that opioids should not be 
withheld from patients who are addicted.121  A judicially imposed 
standard of care and duty for physicians to relieve pain would likely 
not take into account specific statutory restrictions on physicians 
such as the New York State Controlled Substance Act.  Ambiguous 
language in the statute, combined with generalities from the 
standard of care, could place physicians in a situation where they 
 
 115. O’Connell & Robinette, supra note 75, at 147. 
 116. See BECKER, supra note 100. 
 117. The high premiums would be based on the high cost of defense, large 
awards, large settlement value, and a very large number of pain sufferers who 
could file suit if an action for inadequate treatment of pain were recognized. 
 118. Rich, supra note 1, at 46-47 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3302(1) 
(McKinney 1993)). 
 119. Id. at 47. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Sidney H. Schnoll & Michael F. Weaver, Addiction and Pain, 12 AM. J. 
ON ADDICTION §27, §33 (2003); see also Mitchell J. Cohen et al., Ethical Perspectives: 
Opioids Treatment of Chronic Pain in the Context of Addiction, 18 CLINICAL J. OF PAIN 
§99, §106 (2002). 
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would be unsure of whether they could treat a patient. 
Higher insurance rates and a hostile tort environment could 
cause physicians to leave the practice of pain management.122  
Alternatively, a hostile climate for practicing pain management in a 
particular state could encourage physicians practicing pain 
management to move to a less hostile state.123 
It is likely that only physicians who practice a significant 
amount of pain management would continue the practice given a 
significant new expense.124  For example, the threat of liability and 
the cost of insurance have resulted in “a number of general 
practitioners in rural areas [refusing] to deliver babies, imposing 
on their patients the inconvenience of seeking obstetric care in a 
distant metropolitan area.”125  The likely result of higher costs for 
medical malpractice insurance would be fewer physicians 
practicing pain management and higher health care costs for pain 
management.126 
This would likely result in more patients suffering unnecessary 
pain due to difficulties in finding a physician to treat their pain.  As 
of 2002, “with just over 1,000 pain management specialists 
practicing in the United States, patients would have difficulty 
getting prescriptions for needed drugs if only such specialists were 
permitted to prescribe them.”127  In addition to a shortage of pain 
 
 122. Physicians are not required to practice pain management.  Oken, supra 
note 1, at 1989 (“Physicians have every right to say ‘I don’t do palliative care,’ and 
send patients elsewhere.”). 
 123. See Christopher Guadagnino, Physician Shortage in Pennsylvania?, 
PHYSICIANS NEW DIGEST (August 2003) (explaining surging malpractice insurance 
costs coupled with low private insurer reimbursements relative to other states 
resulted in Pennsylvania physicians leaving the state, retiring early, or dropping 
risky procedures); see also Scott Shepard, Malpractice Costs Driving Doctors Away, 
MEMPHIS BUS. J., available at http://www.phg.com/articlepf_a021.htm (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2005) (claiming “crushing costs” for medical malpractice and slow and 
inconvenient state medical licensing procedures are driving physicians from 
Mississippi and discouraging others from taking their place). 
 124. There is an additional factor that could lead physicians to leave the 
practice of pain management: the “hassle factor” of dealing with drug seekers. 
 125. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 403. 
 126. The counter argument to this is that it would be beneficial for pain to 
only be managed by experts who would provide the best standard of care for their 
patients.  However, while it is self-evident that specialists in pain management are 
best suited to deal with the more difficult cases of pain, there is no evidence that 
other physicians, with proper training, are unable to treat the majority of simple 
cases.  In addition, given the number of patients suffering from pain, the result of 
a specialist providing medical care instead of a primary care physician is an 
increase in the overall health care costs of pain management. 
 127. Noah, supra note 37, at 64. 
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management specialists, the United States is currently experiencing 
a general shortage of physicians.128  Increased costs compounded 
with existing concerns regarding criminal penalties and state 
licensing boards will likely result in physicians choosing other areas 
of specialization—exacerbating the shortage of pain management 
specialists. 
B. Individual Moral Rights Justification 
Individual moral rights justifications—or corrective justice 
justifications in the case of tort liability—generally focus on 
achieving justice between the parties.  In the context of medical 
malpractice, the corrective justice theory places the liability for a 
patient’s injury on the negligent party in an attempt to make the 
injured patient whole.129  The individual moral rights justification 
in medical malpractice also includes an aspect of the concept of 
loss spreading: the doctor/hospital/insurance company is better 
able to spread the expenses of an individual’s loss throughout 
society, preventing an individual from having to bear a catastrophic 
loss.130 
In the context of inadequate pain management, the basic 
individual moral rights justification for expanding tort liability is 
that the patient unnecessarily suffered pain that could have been 
prevented but for the physician’s improper pain management.  On 
an individual basis there is an intuitive appeal to this theory 
because if a physician is under an affirmative duty to relieve the 
patient’s pain and this does not occur due to the physician’s 
negligence, then holding the physician liable for the pain that 
occurred is the only civilized way to achieve justice between the 
parties.  Thus, strictly in terms of a corrective justice theory, 
inadequate pain management is a basis for tort liability. 
However, in terms of compensation, “[m]ost analysts agree 
that the medical liability system in the U.S., as a whole, ‘fail[s] 
miserably’ as a method of compensating injured patients.”131  The 
 
 128. See Jennifer Moody, The Physician Shortage is Official: Now What?, HEALTH 
LEADERS NEWS (Jan. 12, 2004) (noting the Council of Graduate Medical Education 
and the AMA reversed their longstanding positions on a physician surplus, both 
now indicating physician shortages); see also Victoria Stagg Elliott, Physician Shortage 
Predicted to Spread, AM. MED. NEWS 1 (Jan. 5, 2004). 
 129. Hottenroth, supra note 104, at 286. 
 130. See 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 759-64 
(1956). 
 131. Hottenroth, supra note 104, at 286 (quoting Randall R. Bovberg, Medical 
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majority of patients injured because of medical negligence never 
file a claim or receive any compensation for their injury.132  In 
addition, the tort liability system is an expensive means of 
performing the compensation function as the cost of investigation, 
trial, and attorney’s fees substantially reduce the recovery of the 
injured patient.  When including the cost of the defense in the 
equation, significantly more money is spent on administering the 
medical malpractice tort and insurance system than is spent on 
compensating injured patients.133 
One difficulty in applying the compensation theory to justify 
tort liability for inadequate pain management is that pain is an 
intangible loss; there is no way to accurately value suffering from 
inadequately managed pain.  This uncertainty in how to value pain 
has led to large and dramatically inconsistent verdicts for pain and 
suffering damages that are a part of other tort awards.134  This has 
also led some critics to question whether awards for pain and 
suffering accomplish the stated goals of compensation.135  However, 
if there is liability for inadequate pain management, then there is 
no other form of damages that would compensate the patient.136  
Because money is the currency of our society, awarding money to 
the injured party is a way for society to recognize the importance of 
the injured party’s losses.137  Accordingly, the purpose of tort 
compensation for pain and suffering is not to compensate for the 
injury so much as to acknowledge its value by “recognizing the 
wrong and signifying its weightiness.”138  Although it is difficult to 
establish the value of suffering from pain, if a cause of action for 
inadequate pain treatment were recognized, this factor would likely 
be treated as an issue of fact for jury determination—as pain and 
 
Malpractice on Trial: Quality of Care is the Important Standard, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 321, 326-28 (Spring 1986)). 
 132. See id. (stating “[A]s many as nine out of ten victims of medical negligence 
never file a claim.”). 
 133. See id. at 287 (stating “[A]s little as twenty-eight cents of each insurance 
premium dollar actually goes to compensate injured patients.”). 
 134. Jeffery C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using 
Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 892 (1994). 
 135. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 658-60 (2d 
ed. 1993). 
 136. Damages based upon an inadequate pain management theory would take 
the place of pain and suffering damages in order to avoid a double recovery. 
 137. Dobbins, supra note 134, at 895. 
 138. Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 
74 (1993). 
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suffering damages currently are treated where pain and suffering is 
only a component of the claim.139 
Although there is a valid corrective justice justification for 
allowing the patient who unnecessarily suffered pain due to a 
physician’s negligence to sue, the issue of whether there is an 
individual moral rights justification for tort liability should focus 
instead on the issue of compensation and whether suffering pain is 
a loss that should be spread throughout society.  Loss spreading is 
the second major individual moral rights justification for tort 
liability and it focuses on the inability of an individual to effectively 
bear the full burden of another’s negligent action.140  In effect, tort 
liability can operate as a form of insurance against loss, albeit an 
expensive form of insurance.  This justification is clearest when the 
plaintiff is negligently injured resulting in additional losses: 
medical expenses, lost income, lost property, etc.  In the case of 
inadequate pain management, it is not clear that pain alone 
qualifies as a loss.  In this situation, it is assumed that the patient’s 
pain was preexisting and the physician’s negligent care did not 
adequately alleviate the pain.  At worst, the patient is in the same 
position they were in before the physician treated them.  In 
addition, there is no loss of property, income, or additional 
expenses involved with inadequate pain treatment.141  The reality of 
medical malpractice insurance is that it is an expense that is 
ultimately born by the consuming public at large.  Physicians and 
hospitals cover the additional expenses eventually through higher 
reimbursement from patients’ insurance companies which results 
in higher insurance premiums for patients.  In the current era of 
skyrocketing medical costs, it is questionable whether there is 
adequate justification for society reimbursing patients for pain they 
were already suffering.  However, modern American society places 
great value on quality of life, and pain is certainly an important 
determinant of quality of life.  Therefore, society may value a pain-
 
 139. See 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ¶ 
18.02 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2003) (stating that the jury typically has 
“broad discrection” in awarding damages for pain and suffering). 
 140. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 130, at 762-63. 
 141. However, it can be argued that the failure to treat pain could result in lost 
wages if the patient was unable to work but would have been able to work with 
adequate treatment.  It could also be argued that failed pain treatment could 
result in additional medical expenses as the patient attempts to have their pain 
treated.  However, both of these situations likely would not amount to damages 
sufficient to warrant the expense of trial in order to recover.  This leaves the real 
issue to be valuing the pain that was unnecessarily suffered. 
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free life highly enough to warrant reimbursing an individual who 
unnecessarily suffered pain due to negligent pain management. 
III. MISMANAGEMENT OF PAIN DOES NOT FIT WITHIN TRADITIONAL 
CONCEPTS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
It is generally recognized that the elements of an action for 
medical malpractice are: (1) the existence of a physician-patient 
relationship giving rise to a duty; (2) a violation of the applicable 
standard of care; (3) proof of injury or damage; and (4) 
development of a causal relationship between the violation of the 
standard of care and the harm.142  The first element is typically not 
at issue as courts generally hold that a physician owes a legal duty of 
care to his or her patients.143  However, the remaining elements 
could prove difficult to establish in a case of inadequate pain 
management. 
A. Standard of Care for Pain Management 
The duty of a physician to exercise reasonable care is 
measured against the “knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed and 
exercised in similar situations by the average member of the 
profession practicing in the field.”144  This is commonly referred to 
as the “standard of care” that a physician’s conduct must conform 
to in order to avoid being held negligent in a court of law.145  This 
“standard, recognizing that ‘medicine is not an exact science,’ 
holds physicians responsible for their negligence without making 
them guarantors of the health of their patients.”146  To satisfy this 
standard a physician’s practice need only comply with the 
customary practice of the average member of the profession.147  It is 
significant to note that a physician usually is only liable for a 
departure from the applicable standard of care, not for a mistake 
in judgment of one appropriate alternative medical treatment over 
another.148 
 
 142. 3 J. D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND 
LITIGATION § 25:1 (2d ed. 2002). 
 143. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 90. 
 144. Aiello v. Muhlenberg Reg’l Med. Ctr., 733 A.2d 433, 437 (N.J. 1999). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. (quoting Schueler v. Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577 (N.J. 1964)). 
 147. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 91. 
 148. 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 142, § 25:16.  However, it is interesting to 
note that many courts have begun to re-examine and reject the “good judgment 
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Because the “standard of care” that a physician’s conduct 
generally must conform to is determined by the customary practice 
of the average physician, the standard of care for pain management 
is currently very low because the average physician is still practicing 
outdated pain management.149  This is the source of the call for 
courts to adopt medical practice guidelines for pain management 
as the standard of care instead of relying upon the customary 
practice of the average member of the profession.150  However, as 
discussed in Part II.A.1, the medical practice guidelines only 
provide general guidance, not specific information of how an 
individual situation should be treated.  Thus, it is not reasonable to 
base the standard of care solely on practice guidelines.  The 
practice guidelines could be useful in rebutting a physician’s claim 
that they were worried about addiction.  Additionally, guidelines 
could be used in conjunction with expert testimony to illustrate the 
inadequacies of a particular pain treatment plan.  However, this 
would require the court to disregard how average physicians deal 
with pain. 
B. Proving Pain as Damages 
Proving pain with sufficient certainty to allow tort recovery 
could be difficult for some suffers of pain that is medically 
unexplainable or unquantifiable.  “Damages for pain and suffering 
. . . are recoverable where there is evidence of actual pain.”151  The 
most common method of proving pain is through the plaintiff’s 
own testimony and the testimony of other witnesses who relate 
their observations of the plaintiff’s pain.152  However, “[j]urors are 
not compelled to find pain where there was no objective injury.”153  
In addition, jurors “are not obliged to believe that every injury 
causes pain or the pain alleged.”154  Thus, in situations where a 
medical cause for the pain suffered can be clearly established, a 
patient would likely be successful in proving pain with sufficient 
 
rule.”  See id. n.5 (citing various recent cases in which courts have rejected this 
rule). 
 149. Rich, supra note 1, at 80. 
 150. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 95; Rich, supra note 1, at 81; Oken, supra 
note 1, at 1975-77; Furrow, supra note 1, at 30. 
 151. 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ¶ 18.02 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2003). 
 152. Furrow, supra note 1, at 36. 
 153. Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 542 A.2d 516, 519 (Pa. 1988). 
 154. Id. at 518. 
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certainty to meet this requirement.  However, in situations where a 
patient claims medically unexplainable pain or claims pain in 
excess of what would medically be expected from a particular injury 
or disease, a jury would have to make the same determination as 
the treating physician regarding the veracity of the patient’s claims 
of pain.  It is questionable whether a patient with medically 
unexplainable pain could prove the suffered pain with sufficient 
certainty to allow tort recovery. 
C. Causal Relationship Between Inadequate Treatment and Suffered Pain 
“In medical malpractice cases, the general rule is that the 
plaintiff must prove causation through medical expert testimony in 
terms of probability to establish that the injury was, more likely 
than not, caused by the defendant’s negligence.”155  However, there 
are situations where traditional notions of proximate causation are 
relaxed to permit recovery, such as where a patient is deprived of a 
chance of recovery despite testimony establishing that the result 
was inevitable regardless of the negligence of the physician (this is 
known as the loss-of-chance theory).156 
In the typical tort case, pain and suffering is the result of a 
physical injury to the plaintiff caused by the defendant.157  Courts 
are generally willing to instruct the jury on pain and suffering only 
when the plaintiff has suffered a tangible injury due to the 
defendant and a causal relationship is established between the 
defendant’s negligence and the tangible injury.158  In the medical 
malpractice setting, pain due to a missed diagnosis resulting in a 
lost opportunity to treat the problem can be a part of the 
damages.159  But failure to adequately treat pain is more 
complicated: the physician is not responsible for the patient’s 
condition or for a worsening of the patient’s condition, but instead 
for pain mismanagement, which is the by-product of an underlying 
disease.160  Under traditional notions of causation, a physician 
cannot be said to have caused the pain suffered by the patient 
 
 155. Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, 668 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ohio 
1996). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Furrow, supra note 1, at 36. 
 158. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 142, § 3:2. 
 159. Id. § 25:85; see also Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (finding 
ophthalmologist defendants liable when they failed to order a glaucoma test for 
plaintiff leading to plaintiff losing part of her vision). 
 160. Furrow, supra note 1, at 36. 
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simply because the physician negligently failed to treat the patient’s 
pain.  However, it is possible that a court would extend the 
reasoning behind the loss-of-chance theory and relax the causation 
requirement when it is clearly established that the plaintiff suffered 
pain that was treatable and was only inadequately treated due to 
the treating physician’s negligence. 
 
IV. TORT LIABILITY WOULD COMPROMISE THE PHYSICIAN’S ROLE AS 
GATEKEEPER FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
 
A. Physicians Are the Gatekeepers of Controlled Substances 
 
Physicians have been legislatively placed in the role of the 
gatekeeper for controlled substances through acts of Congress and 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).161  In 1970, Congress 
passed the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) that created a uniform 
national standard for the control of potentially dangerous drugs 
that have the potential for abuse.162  Under the CSA, in order for a 
physician to prescribe and administer controlled substances, the 
physician must apply to the DEA for a federal license for such 
prescription and administration.163  This license is separate from 
the state license to practice medicine that physicians receive from 
various state medical boards.164  Prescriptions for controlled 
substances are written by DEA licensees on special prescription 
forms and require inclusion of the practitioner’s registration 
number and signature with each controlled substance 
prescription;165 refills are prohibited.166  The DEA requires that for a 
controlled substance prescription to be effective, it “must be issued 
for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner 
acting in the usual course of his professional practice.”167  “The 
responsibility for the proper prescribing . . . of controlled 
 
 161. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2004). 
 162. Noah, supra note 37, at 58. 
 163. See Steven E. Stark, Bio-ethics and Physician Liability: The Liability Effects of 
Developing Pain Management Standards, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 601, 623 (2002). 
 164. See id. 
 165. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.05(a) (2004).  On January 4, 2005, the DEA amended 21 
C.F.R. § 1306.05 and strengthened the restrictions and controls on controlled 
substance prescriptions, requiring that the medical need be written on the 
prescription.  70 Fed. Reg. 291, 292 (Jan. 4, 2005). 
 166. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12 (2004). 
 167. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2004). 
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substances is upon the prescribing practitioner . . . .”168 
“The primary role of the DEA with respect to pharmaceutical 
controlled substances is to prevent, detect, and investigate the 
diversion from legitimate users, while ensuring their availability for 
legitimate medical use.”169  The DEA has authority to suspend or 
revoke the license of practitioners who dispensed drugs in a 
manner that threatens the public health and safety.  “[A]ll of the 
DEA’s policies, procedures, and investigation programs . . . are 
guided by the underlying principles . . . that link the validity of 
prescriptions for controlled substances to the requirement that it 
be ‘issued for a legitimate medical purpose . . . .’”170 
The CSA divides drugs into five different schedules.  Schedule 
I drugs are defined as having a high abuse potential, having no 
currently accepted medical use in the United States, and having a 
lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision.171  
Examples of Schedule I substances are heroin and marijuana.172  
Schedule II drugs are considered to have an accepted medical use 
and to have a high abuse potential that may lead to severe 
psychological or physical dependence.173  Schedule II substances 
are some of the most frequently used for pain management: 
morphine, Demerol, Percodan, and fentanyl.174  Schedule III-V 
substances are similar to Schedule II substances but are 
characterized by progressively decreasing abuse potential in 
comparison with the prior schedule.175 
B. Tort Liability for Pain Management Could Compromise Congressional 
Intent 
Congressional intent is clear that physicians should be 
responsible for determining whether an individual’s condition 
presents a legitimate medical purpose for prescribing a controlled 
substance.176  Such a determination requires the physician to assess 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. H.R. REP. NO. 106-378, at 2-3 (Oct. 13, 1999); Stark, supra note 163, at 
623. 
 170. Stark, supra note 163, at 623-24 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2004)). 
 171. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2000). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. § 812(b)(2). 
 174. Rich, supra note 1, at 44-45. 
 175. 21 U.S.C.S. § 812(b)(3)-(5) (Law. Co-op. 2004). 
 176. In the CSA, Congress specified factors to consider that were primarily 
related to the potential for abuse, rather than accepted medical use.  See Noah, 
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the severity and cause of the pain based on the patient’s reported 
pain, medical history, and physical examination.  The CSA, 
arguably, would pre-empt state tort causes of action for inadequate 
pain management that based liability on a physician’s decision to 
prescribe or withhold controlled substances. 
In Grier v. American Honda Motor Co.,177 the Supreme Court, in a 
5-4 decision, held that a state common-law tort action based on an 
auto manufacturer’s failure to provide airbags was preempted by 
the 1984 version of a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard,178 with 
which the manufacturer had complied.  The Court held the tort 
action was pre-empted because of conflict with the “means-related 
federal objective”179 of the standard.  The standard “deliberately 
sought variety . . .  allowing manufactures to choose among 
different passive restraint mechanisms, such as airbags, automatic 
belts, or other passive restraint technologies.”180  The tort action, 
the Court held, precluded choice by imposing a duty on the 
manufacture to install airbags.181 
A state tort action for inadequate pain management might 
arguably conflict with the congressional objective that CSA 
regulated controlled substances be administered only after a 
physician makes the determination that there is a legitimate 
medical purpose to do so.182  Allowing a jury to make the same 
determination post-hoc creates a conflict because it will create an 
outside influence on the physician’s medical judgment.  The 
defensive medicine phenomenon183 illustrates how the threat of 
tort liability encourages physicians to make decisions that are 
influenced by non-medical factors.  Thus, the CSA would likely pre-
empt state tort actions for inadequate pain management that 
include a duty to prescribe controlled substances. 
 
supra note 37, at 58 n.63. 
 177. 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 178. 49 C.F.R. 571.208 (2004). 
 179. Grier, 529 U.S. at 881. 
 180. Id. at 878. 
 181. Id. at 881. 
 182. See 21 C.F.R. 1306.04(a) (2004). 
 183. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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C. Physicians Should Have Qualified Immunity from Tort Liability for 
the Decisions They Make in the Congressionally Imposed Role of Gatekeeper 
of Controlled Substances 
Physicians are often put in the position of having to judge the 
honesty of patients’ claims of pain in order to prescribe narcotics.  
This is not unlike the position government officials and judges are 
in when they make decisions.  “[G]overnment officials are entitled 
to some form of immunity from suits for damages. . . .  [P]ublic 
officers require this protection to shield them from undue 
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats 
of liability.”184  Federal “qualified immunity shields government 
officials performing discretionary functions ‘from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.’”185 
In Wilkinson v. Russell,186 state social workers were granted 
qualified immunity from suit for an allegedly inadequate child 
abuse investigation that violated settled standards of the profession 
and wrongfully substantiated the mother’s allegations that the 
father had sexually abused the child.187  State social workers did not 
seek corroboration,188 relied on the opinion of a child psychiatrist 
who had met the children only two or three times,189 and ignored 
evidence that the mother coached the child.190  Despite these 
problems, the court concluded that the social workers had a 
reasonable basis for their determination and therefore the 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were not violated.191  This decision 
was “in keeping with the basic precept that a mere failure to meet local 
or professional standards, without more, should not generally be 
elevated to the status of constitutional violation.”192 
There is a contractual relationship between the patient and 
the physician: the physician is offering services to the public for 
pay, not to the state for the public good; and the state has no 
 
 184. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
 185. Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 686 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). 
 186. 182 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 187. Id. at 92. 
 188. Id. at 100. 
 189. Id. at 105. 
 190. Id. at 101. 
 191. Id. at 106. 
 192. Id. (emphasis added). 
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liability for the physician’s actions.193  Nevertheless, physicians 
perform what would otherwise be the role of a government official 
by acting as gatekeepers for controlled substances.194  The physician 
must determine the medical necessity of the prescription.  To do 
this, the physician may have to judge the honesty and truthfulness 
of his or her patient: if the patient is deceiving the physician, the 
prescription may not be medically necessary.  In these situations, 
there is potential for a difficult determination analogous to the 
types of decisions for which government officials are regularly 
granted qualified immunity.  Likewise, it is important that 
physicians be shielded from “undue interference” in their decision 
making regarding whether a patient should receive a controlled 
substance.  Such “undue interference” could interfere with a 
physician making the congressionally-imposed legal decision that a 
prescription for a controlled substance is medically necessary. 
V. PAIN MANAGEMENT IN END-OF-LIFE CARE SITUATIONS 
Tort liability for inadequate pain management may have the 
most appeal in end-of-life situations in which the patient is 
expected to live a short time and is suffering from severe pain.  
Under such circumstances, physicians have less fear that opioids 
will be diverted or abused.195  However, administering opioids to 
patients already weakened by terminal disease has the potential to 
hasten death, typically through respiratory depression.196  When a 
physician prescribes opioids for a patient who has prohibited life 
saving measures,197 that physician knows the opioids may hasten the 
patient’s death.  This decision may go against the moral and ethical 
beliefs of the physician.  Although the Supreme Court has held that 
a patient has a right to palliative care, even if that care hastens 
 
 193. See LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 142, § 16:3 (government liability for the 
actions or omissions of government employees limited to actions within the scope 
of employment). 
 194. One alternative would be a system where the physician’s prescription 
would have to be individually reviewed by a DEA employee to ensure that the 
controlled substance would not be diverted or used for improper purpose.  This 
system of review would be similar to what some health insurance companies do 
when they assign a caseworker to authorize physician decisions regarding health 
care expenditures. 
 195. JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17. 
 196. Id. at 38, 41. 
 197. Such as a ventilator, if the patient stops breathing due to respiratory 
depression. 
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death,198 the Court did not hold an individual physician has an 
affirmative duty to provide such care.  Tort liability for inadequate 
pain management has the potential to penalize a physician for 
choosing, based on his or her own moral and ethical beliefs, not to 
hasten patients’ deaths. 
The case of Bergman v. Chin199 provides a good example of the 
conflicting positions.  At age eighty-five, Bergman was informed he 
likely had terminal lung cancer.  He refused further testing and 
requested hospice care.200  Bergman’s complaint charged Dr. Chin 
with elder abuse for not adequately treating his pain while in the 
hospital and for sending him home without adequate pain 
medication.201  Dr. Chin defended his decision to not use stronger 
opioids, pointing out that Bergman “went into respiratory distress 
and didn’t breathe for about 15 seconds”202 when he was given two 
injections of morphine in the emergency room.  Bergman also 
complained that Dr. Chin’s ordered PRN use of opioids required 
Bergman to suffer pain before receiving relief, and that Bergman’s 
pain was never controlled while in Dr. Chin’s care.203  Once 
Bergman left the hospital and returned to the care of his family 
physician, he was given the morphine that he requested and died 
the next day.204  Dr. Chin was found liable for elder abuse, and the 
jury awarded $1.5 million in damages.205 
The standard of proof in elder abuse cases is higher than in 
medical malpractice cases.  The physician’s conduct must be 
reckless, rather than negligent, in order for him or her to be held 
liable.206  The jury did not indicate upon what basis Dr. Chin was 
held liable, but the case provides an example of the conflict 
between a physician’s duty to not harm the patient and the 
 
 198. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 199. No. H205732-1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2001) (jury form can be viewed 
at http://www.compassionindying.org/bergman/verdict.pdf). 
 200. Susan Okie, Doctor’s Duty to Ease Pain at Issue in Calif. Lawsuit, WASH. POST, 
May 7, 2001, at A03 (providing a thorough recount of Bergman’s situation), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com; see also Mayer, supra note 1, at 327-41. 
 201. Mayer, supra note 1, at 327-41. 
 202. Mark Crane, Now you may be liable for undertreating pain, MED. ECON. 1, 3 
(2001), at http://www.compassionindying.org/bergman/medicalecon.pdf. 
 203. Mayer, supra note 1, at 330-32. 
 204. Okie, supra note 200. 
 205. Mayer, supra note 1, at 341. 
 206. Doctor Liable for not Giving Enough Pain Medication, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/13/elderabuse.lawsuit (last visited Jan. 23, 
2005). 
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patient’s right to be free from pain.  In this case, Dr. Chin had 
sound medical reasons for not providing stronger opioid 
treatment, yet a jury found his behavior not merely negligent, but 
reckless.207 
VI. CURRENT CHANGES WILL ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 
OF INADEQUATE PAIN MANAGEMENT 
Inadequacy of the changes in pain management practices and 
the need for discussions of ethical issues, are often cited as reasons 
why tort liability for inadequate pain treatment is necessary to force 
changes in pain management techniques and beliefs.  However, 
significant changes have occurred that will likely effectuate the 
changes in pain management habits that are sought by tort liability 
proponents without resorting to tort liability and the potential 
problems tort liability presents for inadequate pain management. 
A. Changes in Hospital Accreditation 
Effective January 2, 2001, “the Joint Commission on the 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) . . . 
require[d] hospitals, homecare agencies, nursing homes, 
behavioral health facilities, outpatient clinics, and health plans to 
implement specific strategies to assess and manage pain.”208  These 
standards require healthcare providers to: 
[1] Recognize the rights or patients to appropriate 
assessment and management of pain . . . [2] Assess the 
existence and . . . the intensity of pain in all patients . . . 
[3] Record the results of the assessment in a way that 
facilitates reassessment and follow-up . . . [4] Determine 
and ensure staff competency in pain assessment and 
management and address pain assessment that supports 
the appropriate prescription of ordering of effective pain 
management . . . [5] Establish policies and procedures 
that support appropriate prescription or ordering of pain 
medication . . . [6] Educate patients and their families 
about effective pain management . . . [7] Include patients’ 
needs for symptom management in the discharge 
 
 207. This case also illustrates the dangers of putting a sympathetic plaintiff 
who suffers pain in front of a jury and expecting a jury to evaluate a physician’s 
pain treatment decision-making objectively.  Bergman v. Chin, No. H205732-1 
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2001). 
 208. Frank-Stromborg & Christensen, supra note 3, at 276-78. 
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planning process . . . [8] Collect data to monitor the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of pain management.209 
The JCAHO standards for pain management have the 
potential to radically improve and change the treatment of pain at 
the locations where severe pain is most likely to be suffered—in 
hospitals and nursing homes.  A common result of the new JCAHO 
standard is that hospitals will take a multidisciplinary approach to 
pain treatment that gives a voice to other groups in the hospital—
such as nursing and pharmacy—in creating a patient’s pain 
treatment plan.210  Giving these other parties a say in a patient’s 
pain management plan prevents the opinion of an individual 
physician from preventing a patient from receiving adequate pain 
relief.211  This also helps to ensure that the hospital’s policies that 
have met the JCAHO accreditation standards are uniformly applied 
to every patient in the institution.212 
While accreditation is voluntary, JCAHO accreditation can be 
substituted for federal certification surveys that are required before 
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement can be received; 
additionally, JCAHO accreditation fulfills licensure requirements in 
many states.213  Thus, the majority of hospitals will implement the 
JCAHO standards.214  However, currently these standards will not 
directly affect all cases of pain management that occur, because 
physicians who do not work at regulated organizations are not 
covered.  Looking to the future though, all physicians will 
eventually be affected by the new standards because physicians are 
only trained in accredited hospitals—hospitals that are required to 
implement the new standards.  Unfortunately, the new standards 
have not been in place long enough to evaluate their direct effect 
on pain management. 
 
 209. Id. at 276-77 (citing JCAHO Standards, 2001). 
 210. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 
Improving the Quality of Pain Management Through Measurement and Action, at 
http://www.jcaho.org/news+room/health+care+issues/pain+mono_jc.pdf (Mar. 
2003). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See Facts about the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization, 
at http://www.jcaho.org/about+us/index.htm [hereinafter Facts about JCAHO] 
(last modified July 2004). 
 214. See Dennis S. O'Leary, President’s Message, at 
http://www.jcaho.org/about+us/president+message.htm (indicating that JCAHO 
accredits more than 15,000 health organizations in the United States) (last visited 
March 11, 2005). 
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The JCAHO accreditation standards related to pain 
management address the majority of the concerns cited by scholars 
supporting the need for tort liability.  One concern frequently cited 
in support of tort liability for inadequate pain management is that 
current medical school curriculums do not include any content 
regarding pain management.215  Critics contend that tort liability is 
necessary to force physicians to obtain training in current pain 
management techniques.216  The focus on medical school 
curriculum may be misplaced however, because generally, 
physicians learn their clinical practice methods through clinical 
training obtained in hospitals and medical clinics during the last 
two years of medical school and the three or more years of 
residency training—not in a formal classroom style setting.217  This 
may be a significant factor in why advances in pain management 
were not generally learned by new physicians: the physicians 
training these new physicians did not practice using the advances in 
pain management, so new physicians were not exposed to the 
advances.  However, subject to the new JCAHO requirements, 
institutions that train new physicians will require all physicians 
practicing there to follow guidelines that utilize the advances in 
pain management—resulting in future generations of physicians 
that do not perpetuate misconceptions regarding pain treatment 
and opioid prescription. 
The JCAHO accreditation standards for pain management also 
address the often-cited concern that there needs to be a counter-
pressure to the factors that discourage physicians from prescribing 
adequate opioids to relieve pain.218  The JCAHO standards address 
this concern because for most physicians to practice medicine in a 
hospital or other healthcare institution, they will be required to 
meet these standards.219  While not all physicians have admitting 
privileges in a hospital or other healthcare facility are covered by 
the JCAHO standards, the majority of physicians who deal with 
significant pain will be, especially in the case of terminal pain as 
 
 215. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 28, 33-34; Rich, supra note 1, at 10; Oken, 
supra note 1, at 1933; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 88. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See generally Physician Education for a Changing Health Care Environment, 
Council on Graduate Medical Education, Thirteenth Report (Mar. 1999), at 
http://www.cogme.gov/13.pdf. 
 218. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 28-29; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 89. 
 219. See Facts about JCAHO, supra note 213 (indicating that the majority of 
hospitals will implement the JCAHO standards). 
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these patients usually end up in the hospital.  Because many 
physicians do practice in hospitals and other healthcare institutions 
that are accredited under JCAHO, the requirements that the 
physicians comply with the institution’s pain management 
standards will effectively force these physicians to bring their 
practice into compliance with the standards.  In addition, as 
hospitals and other large healthcare institutions are required to 
implement these changes, they in turn have the potential to be 
powerful political voices to effectuate necessary changes in state 
medical boards and federal agency standards and policies which 
unreasonably inhibit pain relief. 
This form of change has a high success probability because the 
medical profession is driving it internally.  The determination of 
whether an individual should receive opioids for pain relief is, 
legally speaking, strictly a medical decision.220  In addition, 
institutional review of an individual’s action in regard to individual 
cases of pain mismanagement should result in efficient correction 
of problems, preventing repeated problems and giving an effective 
medium for aggrieved patients to voice their concerns regarding an 
individual physician.  This may not be as vindicating for the 
individual’s rights as winning a judgment in court, but it has 
greater potential to effectuate meaningful change rapidly and with 
less confrontation than recovering damages in a civil trial. 
A final issue that will be effectively addressed by the JCAHO 
accreditation standards is the concern that the courts need to set 
the standard of care based on recommended practice guidelines 
instead of current national physician practices.221  The JCAHO 
accreditation standards regarding pain management effectively 
force most hospitals and healthcare facilities to implement current 
practices in pain management in the care their patients receive.222  
This will inevitably change the clinical pain management practices 
of the majority of physicians in the country.  Once this has 
 
 220. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2004) (physician is responsible for determining 
the medical necessity for controlled substance to be prescribed). 
 221. See Furrow, supra note 1, at 32-33; Rich, supra note 1, at 81-83. 
 222. See Facts about JCAHO, supra note 213; Joint Commission Focuses on Pain 
Management, at http://www.hcaho.org/news+room/health+care+issues/jcaho+ 
focuses+on+pain+management.htm (Aug. 3, 1999).  JCAHO’s current 
accreditation standards include current practice in pain management.  JCAHO 
accredits most hospitals and health care facilities.  For these hospitals to remain 
accredited, they have to meet JCAHO’s requirements regarding pain 
management, resulting in the adoption of JCAHO’s pain management standards 
in most hospitals and health care facilities.  See Facts about JCAHO, supra note 213. 
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occurred, courts will only have to look to the national standard of 
care to determine if a physician has been negligent in relieving 
pain.  Thus, there is no need for a legislature or judge to take the 
determination of an appropriate standard of care of pain 
management away from the nation’s practicing physicians. 
B. Changes in State Regulation of Medicine 
“Many states are attempting to address pain management 
concerns through their legislatures by enacting new laws or by 
making changes to current laws.”223  In addition, “the 
undertreatment of pain is being addressed [in some states] by 
enacting administrative rules and guidelines or by enforcing these 
rules more diligently.”224  For example, California has passed a bill 
“requiring all California doctors to take a pain management 
course.”225  The law “also requires that the state medical board track 
complaints of doctors mishandling pain care and ensure that those 
complaints are reviewed by a pain specialist.”226  In addition, the 
Supreme Court’s rulings on physician-assisted suicide in Washington 
v. Glucksberg227 and Vacco v. Quill228 have “prompted state legislatures 
to enact new and revise existing intractable pain statutes, which are 
designed to encourage the administration of opioid analgesics and 
other controlled substances in appropriate circumstances.”229  “At 
present, a majority of states have in place laws that directly address 
pain management issues and many have enacted more than one.”230 
As an example, Minnesota has directly addressed the issue of 
pain management in several statutes.  Minnesota’s Intractable Pain 
Treatment Act231 addresses physicians fears of regulatory scrutiny 
for the prescription of controlled substances by stating that “[n]o 
physician shall be subject to disciplinary action by the Board of 
Medical Practice for appropriately prescribing or administering a 
controlled substance . . . in the course of treatment of an individual 
for intractable pain. . . .”232  Furthermore, Minnesota’s Criminal 
 
 223. Frank-Stromborg & Christensen, supra note 3, at 277. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Mayer, supra note 1, at 348. 
 226. Id. at 349. 
 227. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 228. 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 229. Oken, supra note 1, at 1964. 
 230. Id. 
 231. MINN. STAT. § 152.125 (2003). 
 232. Id. § 152.125, subd. 2. 
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Code shields healthcare providers from a charge of aiding suicide 
or aiding attempted suicide for prescribing opioids to treat a 
patient’s pain “unless the medications . . . are knowingly 
administered . . .  to cause death.”233 
Thus, significant changes have occurred and continue to 
occur.  These changes are improving pain management without 
resorting to tort liability. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that many physicians’ pain management practices 
are out-of-date and largely ineffective.  However, the myopic view 
that tort liability for inadequate pain management is necessary to 
improve the treatment of pain in the United States fails to consider 
all of the implications of such liability.  This limited view also fails 
to consider how other changes in the healthcare system might 
accomplish effective pain management strategies.  In addition, 
although there are studies that indicate that opioids are not as 
addictive as many physicians fear,234 these studies are generally 
limited to patients suffering from cancer pain.235 
The rapid growth in the abuse of painkillers236 substantiates 
physicians’ fears of over-prescribing opioids.  Pain management is 
too complex of an issue to be guided by a simple declaration that a 
physician has a duty to relieve a patient’s pain.  Such a duty has the 
potential to drastically reduce the availability of physicians 
providing pain relief for their patients by creating a professionally 
untenable situation.  An attempt to use clinical practice guidelines 
to impose a standard of care that does not reflect the practices of 
the average physician could result in a flood of litigation given the 
sheer number of people in the United States who suffer from 
inadequately controlled pain.  In contrast, by using existing 
changes in the accreditation of hospitals, the goal of improving 
pain relief can be achieved without implicating the problems 
associated with tort liability.  Before imposing a new form of tort 
liability, a court or legislature should look beyond the interests of 
the parties directly impacted by the new tort and examine the 
overall impact on society.  In the case of inadequate pain 
 
 233. MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subd. 3 (2003). 
 234. See JCAHO Pain Assessment, supra note 18, at 17. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See 2002 Drug Survey, supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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management, the balance is tipped to a finding that tort liability is 
unnecessary and restrictive—society does not gain enough benefit 
to outweigh the cost such liability would impose. 
However, this balance could change in the future.  Once the 
average physician’s pain management practices are in line with 
recommended guidelines, it is possible that tort liability for 
inadequate pain management could be socially useful in some 
situations.  For example, in end-of-life care, there is not a justifiable 
concern about diversion of opioids, especially if a professional 
caregiver administers the opioids.  The only valid concern would be 
the moral and ethical dilemma created by the potential for 
hastening a patient’s death.  As long as the laws governing tort 
liability expressly recognize that a physician is not required to 
provide pain relief that could be potentially harmful, it is possible 
that tort liability could serve a socially useful function by helping to 
ensure that physician negligence does not result in unnecessarily 
painful, avoidable deaths. 
In the situation of acute or non-terminal chronic pain, it is 
unlikely that tort liability for inadequate pain management could 
exist without compromising the impartiality required by Congress 
to ensure that controlled substances are not diverted for improper 
use.  Any type of liability could be used by a “drug seeker” to exert 
pressure on a physician to prescribe controlled substances and 
would likely be pre-empted by federal drug control laws. 
Today, there is insufficient justification for tort liability for 
inadequate pain management.  Thus, inadequate pain 
management should continue as is—a form of damage that the tort 
system does not recognize. 
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